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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNN) trained in a supervised way suffer from two known problems.
First, the minima of the objective function used in learning correspond to data points (also known
as rubbish examples or fooling images) that lack semantic similarity with the training data. Sec-
ond, a clean input can be changed by a small, and often imperceptible for human vision, per-
turbation, so that the resulting deformed input is misclassified by the network. These findings
emphasize the differences between the ways DNN and humans classify patterns, and raise a ques-
tion of designing learning algorithms that more accurately mimic human perception compared to
the existing methods.
Our paper examines these questions within the framework of Dense Associative Memory
(DAM) models. These models are defined by the energy function, with higher order (higher
than quadratic) interactions between the neurons. We show that in the limit when the power of
the interaction vertex in the energy function is sufficiently large, these models have the following
three properties. First, the minima of the objective function are free from rubbish images, so that
each minimum is a semantically meaningful pattern. Second, artificial patterns poised precisely
at the decision boundary look ambiguous to human subjects and share aspects of both classes
that are separated by that decision boundary. Third, adversarial images constructed by models
with small power of the interaction vertex, which are equivalent to DNN with rectified linear units
(ReLU), fail to transfer to and fool the models with higher order interactions. This opens up a
possibility to use higher order models for detecting and stopping malicious adversarial attacks.
The presented results suggest that DAM with higher order energy functions are closer to human
visual perception than DNN with ReLUs.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks are highly sensitive to small well-designed perturbations of the inputs,
known as adversarial perturbations, which lead to misclassifications of these perturbed inputs.
Consider images as an example of the data. A raw image, which is correctly classified by the
neural network, can be modified in a small (and often imperceptible to our vision) way, so that
the resulting deformed image is classified as a different class [1]. A related problem is that DNN
classify certain images as belonging to some class, although they are unrecognizable to humans
as exemplars of any class [2]. These rubbish or fooling images correspond to patches of the image
space that have a small value of the objective function used in training and are located far away
from any of the training data. These observations has challenged the integrity of DNN classification
and has led to an opinion that their predictions are untrustworthy (see discussion of this issue in
numerous blogs), though similar problems are shared by many other machine learning techniques,
such as logistic regression, support vector machines, K-nearest neighbors and others [3].
1Simons Center for Systems Biology, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ, 08540, USA, krotov@ias.edu
2Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 08544, USA, hopfield@princeton.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
00
93
9v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  4
 Ja
n 2
01
7
Further investigation have shown that both adversarial images and rubbish images can be
transferred between many different models having distinct architectures, different hyperparam-
eters, and even trained on different training sets [1, 2]. Moreover, some of the adversarial and
rubbish images can be transferred between a diverse set of models in machine learning [3]. This
opens up a possibility for a potential adversarial attack, when a hacker can train his own model
and create a set of images that are misclassified by it, and then deploy this set of images against
another victim model, which will also misclassify them. Realistic attacks were studied in [3, 4, 5].
Often they do not require any internal knowledge of the victim model.
In addition to being a security issue, transferability suggests that various computational models
learn very similar representations of the data. It also suggests that in order to address these
problems, one might have to design training algorithms that learn a very different representation
of the data compared to the existing methods. An ideal solution to these issues should be an
algorithm that assigns small values of the objective function only to those areas of the image
space that are recognizable by humans as images of the corresponding class. It should also require
a substantial and recognizable by humans deformation of the initial correctly classified image
towards a different target class before the label changes. In spite of a substantial amount of
work on these problems [6, 7, 8, 9, 10], no algorithm have been identified so far which satisfies
these requirements and at the same time is competitive to state of the art algorithms in terms of
classification accuracy.
In a recent paper [11] it was proposed that Dense Associative Memory (DAM) models with
higher order interactions in the energy function learn representations of the data, which strongly
depend on the power of the interaction vertex. The network extracts features form the data for
small values of this power, but as the power of the interaction vertex is increased there is a gradual
shift to a prototype-based representation, the two extreme regimes of pattern recognition known
in cognitive psychology. Remarkably, there is a broad range of powers of the energy function,
for which the representation of the data is already in the prototype regime, but the accuracy of
classification is still competitive to the best available algorithms (based on DNN with ReLUs).
This suggests that the DAM models might behave very differently compared to the standard
methods used in deep learning with respect to adversarial deformations.
In the present paper we report three main results. First, using a gradient decent in the pixel
space, a set of “rubbish” images is constructed that correspond to the minima of the objective
function used in training. This is done on the MNIST dataset of handwritten digits using different
values of the power of the interaction vertex, which is denoted by n. For small values of the power
n these images indeed look like speckled rubbish noise, and do not have any semantic content
for human vision, a result consistent with [2]. However, as the power of the interaction vertex is
increased the images gradually become less speckled and more semantically meaningful. In the
limit of very large n ≈ 20...30, these images are no longer rubbish at all. They represent plausible
images of handwritten digits that could have possibly been produced by a human. Second, starting
from clean images from the dataset a set of adversarial images is constructed in such a way that
each image is placed exactly on the decision boundary between two label classes. For small powers
n these images look very similar to the initial clean image with a little bit of speckled noise added,
but are misclassified by the neural network, a result consistent with [1]. However, as the power
of the interaction vertex is increased these adversarial images become less and less similar to the
initial clean image. In the limit of very large powers these adversarial images look either like a
morphed image of two digits (the initial clean image and another digit from the class that the
deformation targets), or the initial digit superimposed on a “ghost” image from the target class.
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Either way the interpretation of the artificial patterns generated by the neural net on the decision
boundary requires the presence of another digit from the target class in addition to the initial
seed from the dataset, and cannot be explained by simply adding noise to the initial clean image.
Third, adversarial and rubbish images generated by models with small n can be transferred to
and fool another model with small (but possibly different) value n. However, they fail to transfer
to models with large n. Thus rubbish and adversarial images generated by models with small
n cannot fool models with large n. In contrast, the “rubbish” images generated by models with
large n can be transferred to models with small n, but this is not a problem since those “rubbish”
images are actually not rubbish at all and look like credible handwritten digits. These results
suggest that the DAMs with a large power of the interaction vertex in the energy function better
mimic the psychology of human visual perception than DAMs with a small power. The latter are
equivalent to DNNs with ReLUs [11].
2 Data representation in DAMn networks
In order to illustrate these results in the simplest possible setting we trained a family of DAM
networks for several values of the power of the energy function on the MNIST pixel permutation
invariant task. The model is defined by a set of weights ξµi and ξ
µ
α and the feedforward update
Y↵
x↵ =  1vi = image
vi = image
Figure 1: Architecture of the neural network. Visible neurons vi are equal to the intensities of the pixels, so
that the 8-bit intensities are linearly mapped onto the segment [−1,+1]. There are N = 784 visible neurons vi,
and Nc = 10 classification neurons, which are initialized in the “off” state xα = −1 and then updated once to the
final state Yα using (1). The model has K = 2000 memories, with visible parts ξ
µ
i and recognition part ξ
µ
α, index
µ = 1...K. Parameter β regulates the slope of the tanh function.
rule
Yα = tanh
[
β
( K∑
µ=1
Fn
(
ξµi vi + ξ
µ
α −
∑
γ 6=α
ξµγ
)− Fn(ξµi vi − ξµα −∑
γ 6=α
ξµγ
))]
(1)
where summation over repeated index i is assumed. The functions Fn are rectified polynomials [11]
Fn(x) =
{
xn, x ≥ 0
0, x < 0
(2)
As we explained in [11], the argument of the update rule (1) is the difference of two energies,
corresponding to the initial and the final states of the neurons. For this reason the functions
Fn(x) are called the energy functions in the rest of the paper, and the integer n is called the
power of the interaction vertex. The weights are learned using a backpropagation algorithm (see
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Appendix A of [11]) starting from random initial seeds by minimizing the objective function
C =
∑
training
examples
Nc∑
α=1
(
Yα − tα
)2m
, (3)
where tα is the target output (tα = −1 for the wrong classes and tα = +1 for the correct class).
Hyperparameter m regulates the shape of the objective function.
In [11] we investigated this model for varying powers of the energy functions Fn and discovered
that the network learns feature-based representations of the data for small n and prototype-based
representations for large n. This is clear from the Fig.2. For small n each feature detector ξµi
describes a feature which is useful for recognizing several different digit classes. As the power n
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Figure 2: Feature to prototype transition for powers of the energy function n = 2, 3, 20, 30. For each model 25
randomly selected feature (or prototype) detectors ξµi are shown. The value of the i-th element of a detector is
plotted in the location of the i-th pixel to which it couples in the update rule (1). The weights are normalized so
that 1 ≤ ξµi ≤ 1. The color code is explained by the color bar.
is increased, most of the feature detectors specialize and become responsible for recognizing one
possible prototype, which is a constructed representation and is not simply a copy of one image
from the training set. Importantly, throughout the range n = 2...30 the classification accuracy
remains approximately the same, errortest = 1.4 − 1.8%. This is comparable to the best result
1.6%, achieved by the standard DNNs trained with backpropagation alone [12].
3 Rubbish examples in DAMn networks
Once the training is complete, the neural network can be used to inspect the minima of the
objective function. In order to do that one can define a set of Nc = 10 objective functions each
penalizing the deviations from the corresponding class
Cα =
Nc∑
γ=1
(
Yγ − t(α)γ
)2m
(4)
with the target output
t(α)γ =
{
−1, for γ 6= α
+1, for γ = α
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A random image generated from a gaussian distribution can then be deformed into 10 images
(sufficiently close to the initial one in the pixel space) corresponding to the 10 label classes by
following the (negative) gradient of the objective functions according to the iterative rule
vi → vi − εu
(∂Cα
∂vi
)
, (5)
where u
(
∂Cα
∂vi
)
is a unit vector, which points in the direction of the gradient of the objective
function Cα, and ε is the size of the update step. This dynamics flows towards the minimum of
the objective function, thus for a good learning algorithm we expect to see a recognizable image of
the corresponding digit once it reaches the fixed point. The actual results are shown in Fig.3. For
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Figure 3: Examples of images generated from a gaussian noise N (0, 0.1) by following the gradient of the 10
objective functions corresponding to 10 digit classes for model (1) with n = 2, 3, 20, 30. For n = 2 and n = 3 each
final image is labeled. For n = 20 and n = 30 the labels are clear from the images. Throughout this paper we use
grayscale intensities for representation of the image plane. They should not be confused with the color images, like
the one in Fig.2, which shows the network’s weights.
small n the dynamics converges to local minima which are not recognizable as digits by humans.
These are the rubbish minima of [2]. The training algorithm has learned them while trying to
minimize the classification error on the training set. In contrast, for large n the dynamics flows
towards a minimum of the objective function that corresponds to a recognizable image of the
corresponding digit. Thus this simple experiment demonstrates that for DAM with large n the
minima of the objective function have semantic meaning in the image space, while for models with
small n these minima are semantically meaningless. All this is achieved by training the network
in a purely supervised way on the pixel permutation invariant task.
5
4 Adversarial deformations
A clean image, which is classified by a neural network as belonging to a certain class, can be
modified by a small perturbation so that the deformed image is classified as a different class.
What makes this statement a problem is that the perturbation, which is sufficient for changing
the label, is small and typically is a speckled pattern that lacks semantic meaning. The most
common technique for generating adversarial images is the sign of the gradient method of [13].
For our purposes it is necessary to generate images that are placed exactly on the decision boundary
between the classes and not just in its vicinity. For this reason we use a slightly different method.
For each input image the vector of labels can be calculated by using (1). The elements of this
vector can be sorted from largest to smallest value. The largest value of the output corresponds to
the top classification choice of the network, the second largest output corresponds to the second
choice, etc. The initial image can then be iteratively deformed along the (negative) gradient
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Figure 4: (Top panel) Logarithm of the top-choice and second-choice objective functions as the iterative dynamics
following the negative gradient of the second-choice objective function (red) progresses. The crossing point defines
the decision boundary. (Bottom panel) A set of triplets of images for n = 2, 3, 20, 30, three per model. The first
image in each triplet is a natural image from the dataset, the middle image is an artificial image corresponding
to the crossing point of the two objective functions (decision boundary), the third image corresponds to the final
point of the iterative dynamics, when the second-choice objective function (red curve) reaches zero.
of the objective function corresponding to the second choice of the label made by the network.
During this iterative process the first choice objective function will increase, and the second choice
objective function will decrease (see top panel in Fig.4). The image itself should gradually change
from the initial clean image to an image that the network thinks should correspond to the second
choice label. At some iteration the two objective functions become equal. This is the mathematical
definition of the decision boundary. From the point of view of the neural network the image that
corresponds to this point on the deformation trajectory is exactly in the middle between the two
classes. The question is whether a human observer would agree with this interpretation, in other
6
words whether or not this image looks ambiguous to humans.
This method of generating the adversarial images has an advantage compared to [13] since it
guarantees that the image at the crossing point of the two objective functions is placed exactly
on the decision boundary, and not just close to it. Also, in contrast to [13], it does not require a
careful choice of the iteration step ε in (5), provided that it is sufficiently small. The procedure
will simply need more steps in order to find the correct image corresponding to the crossing point,
if the step is too small. The drawback of this method compared to [13] is that it is slower.
In Fig.4 one can find a set of triplets of images generated by models with different values of
power n. In each triplet, the first image is the initial clean image from the dataset, the second
image is the one that the neural network has generated on the decision boundary, and the third
one is the image that the network has generated when the iterative procedure (5) has converged
to the second choice label of the initial clean image. Two observations can be made from this
figure. First, as the power of the interaction vertex is increased, the third image in each triplet
becomes more semantically meaningful. This is in accord with the results of Fig.3. Second, as
the power of the interaction vertex is increased, the adversarial image (the middle image) on the
decision boundary becomes more meaningful as well. For n = 2 or n = 3, the middle image
looks almost the same as the initial clean image with a little bit of added speckled noise. The
noise does not share much similarity with the second choice label. In contrast, for n = 30, the
deformation does not look like noise at all. The middle image looks as if the two digits (the initial
seed and a digit from the target class) were morphed together in one image, or as if the second digit
was added as a “ghost” image to the initial digit. These results suggest that models with large
powers n not only learn semantically meaningful set of minima of the objective function, but also
learn semantically meaningful deformations between the classes. This is achieved by training the
network on the pixel permutation invariant classification task, not by training it as a generative
model. In principle, the target class does not have to necessarily coincide with the second choice
of the initial classification decision. This convention is used for convenience. To the best of our
knowledge, the results do not change qualitatively if instead of the second choice label, the initial
image is deformed towards any other label but the top one.
5 Transferability between the models with various n
The most intriguing finding about rubbish and adversarial images is that they can be transferred
between a diverse set of machine learning models. In order to test this phenomenon within the
DAM framework we designed two experiments: one concerns the transfer of adversarial images
and the other one concerns the transfer of rubbish images.
In the first experiment the MNIST test set was used to generate adversarial examples by the
four models with n = 2, 3, 20, 30, resulting in four datasets each having 10000 images. For each
clean image from the test set the procedure described in section 4 was used to generate an artificial
image placed one iteration step behind the decision boundary defined in Fig.4. The resulting image
is thus classified as the second choice of the network on the original image. These four adversarial
datasets were used for the cross-classification by the same four models. The error rates are shown
in Fig.5. The diagonal elements of this table are close to 100%, which is guaranteed by the design
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n=2
n=2
n=3 n=20 n=30
n=3
n=20
n=30
ge
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test
98.9% 50.7% 9.07% 3.44%
33.9% 99% 8.71% 3.32%
45.3% 63.7% 98.9% 5.77%
37.6% 48.3% 56.9% 98.8%
test errorn=2 = 1.51%
test errorn=3 = 1.44%
test errorn=20 = 1.61%
test errorn=30 = 1.80%
clean MNIST test set:
Figure 5: Transfer table of adversarial examples. The MNIST test set was used to construct four test sets of
adversarial images, poised one step behind the decision boundary, for n = 2, 3, 20, 30. These four datasets were
cross-classified by the same four models. Each dataset has 10000 images. The number at the intersection of the
i-th row and the j-th column is the error rate of the j-th model on the adversarial dataset constructed using the
i-th model. On the right the error rates of the four models on the original MNIST test set.
of the datasets3. The most important aspect of this table is that the adversarial images generated
by models with n = 2 and n = 3 do not transfer to the model with n = 30. These images
share semantic similarity with the clean image that was used as an initial seed for crafting them,
but do not generally have semantic features of the target class of the deformation. The model
with n = 30 can detect this similarity with the initial image and can still correctly classify 97%
of these cases. In contrast the adversarial images crafted using the model with n = 30 can be
transferred to models with n = 2, 3. However, as we argued in the previous section this is expected
since these images share semantic similarities with both the initial seed and the target class of
the deformation. Thus, any machine learning algorithm or a human subject should misclassify a
substantial fraction of them.
In the second experiment an artificial dataset was created, so that data correspond to the
minima of the 10 objective functions Cα. For each sample a random noise image was generated
from a gaussian distribution, which was then iteratively changed in the direction of the negative
gradient according to (5) until convergence. The dataset has 100 images of each label class, 1000
images in total. This procedure was repeated for each value of n = 2, 3, 20, 30. The resulting
four datasets were used for cross-classification by the same four models. The results are shown in
Fig.6, but to discuss them we need to first introduce the notion of confidence.
Confidence
The output of the network (1) is a collection of Nc numbers −1 ≤ Yα ≤ 1. For the following
discussion it is convenient to define a measure of confidence that the neural network has in making
a classification decision. If the actual outputs Yα are approximately equal to the target output,
3The reason why the error rate is around 99% instead of 100% is because the classification error on the clean
dataset is about 1.5%, and in about 1% of the cases the second choice of the network is the correct answer. Thus in
these rare cases the adversarial deformation used to generate the dataset actually turns the incorrect answer into
the correct one.
8
n=2
n=2
n=3 n=20 n=30
n=3
n=20
n=30
ge
ne
ra
te
test
98.5% 98.5% 10% 10%
98.3% 98.5% 10% 10%
98.3% 98.4% 98.5% 25.2%
96.8% 98.2% 97.5% 98.5%
21 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
Figure 6: Transfer table. Each raw corresponds to a model that was used to generate an artificial data set (100
images per digit class, 1000 images in total) by following the gradient of the objective function. Each column
corresponds to a model that was used to recognize these images. The number at the intersection is the mean
confidence (the probability of the most probable label) produced by the test model. On the right one sample from
the artificial dataset per label class. The labels of the images are shown in green at the bottom of each column. A
single value βsm = 3.2 is used in this experiment. The results remain qualitatively similar if each model uses its
own value of βsm in test time.
the confidence is high. In contrast, if the outputs Yα are all approximately zero, with one being
slightly larger than the rest Nc − 1, the confidence is low. To quantify this effect, it is useful to
pass the outputs through a softmax function to define a probability of each label given the input
Pα =
exp
(
βsmYα
)
Nc∑
γ=1
exp
(
βsmYγ
) ,
where the parameter βsm is a number that regulates the steepness of the soft-max function. For
each input image the confidence Z of the network is defined as the probability of the most probable
label. Thus if the network is confident that the presented image belongs to a certain class Z ≈
100%, while if the network is unsure about what is shown in the image the distribution of labels
is flat, and Z ≈ 10% (in case of 10 classes for MNIST). The parameter βsm should be chosen in
such a way that the average confidence of the network on a dataset matches its error on the test
set. If the outputs of the network were exactly equal to the target outputs for all inputs, then
the average confidence on a dataset would be equal to (since there is one correct choice and nine
incorrect ones)
Z =
eβsm
eβsm + 9e−βsm
≈ 0.985
The error rate of all our models is of the order of 1.5%, which defines the right hand side of
the above equation. This results in βsm ≈ 3.2. Since the outputs of the networks are in general
slightly different from the target outputs, the actual values of βsm are different for the four models
that are discussed. They are: βn=2sm = 4.7, β
n=3
sm = 4.6, β
n=20
sm = 4, β
n=30
sm = 26. However, all the
conclusions presented below remain true, for any values of βsm as long as they stay within the
range 2 ≤ βsm ≤ 107.
The images from the MNIST test set can be binned into groups having certain confidence
and the classification error can be calculated on each bin. The results are shown in Fig.7. The
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Figure 7: The 10000 images from the MNIST test set are binned in groups having a certain value of confidence.
The classification error for each group is calculated. The values of the slope are: βn=2sm = 4.7, β
n=3
sm = 4.6, β
n=20
sm = 4,
βn=30sm = 26.
probability of error decreases as the confidence increases, a result suggesting that the confidence
measure is a meaningful quantity. Now we return to the discussion of the second experiment
pertaining to the analysis of “rubbish” images.
In Fig.6 the mean confidence of the 16 cross-classification pairs is reported together with 10
sample images from each dataset, one for each class, for the four data sets. The bottom row
corresponds to the data generated by the model with n = 2. The samples look like rubbish
images, in accord with Fig.3. These rubbish images are recognized by the network with n = 2 at
the average confidence 98.5%, which is the result of the particular choice of the value βsm. These
rubbish images can be transferred to the model with n = 3, which is also very confident that they
correspond to the correct labels. However, if one tries to transfer these rubbish images to the
models with n = 20 or n = 30, these higher order models immediately detect that these images do
not correspond to any class and produce an average confidence ≈ 10%. This accurately mimics
the behavior of a human subject who would immediately detect that these rubbish images are
semantically meaningless, thus should not belong to any class. The same conclusion applies to
the dataset constructed by the model with n = 3. In contrast, the dataset constructed by the
model with n = 30 is composed of nice images of digits, which are recognizable by humans. These
images can be transferred to any model with n ≤ 30 without loss in confidence. These results
suggest that models with large n better mimic human visual cognition, compared to models with
small n, both at generation and at testing.
From the security perspective these results suggest that the models with large n can be used
to detect and stop a potential hacker attack, which is devised by exploiting conventional machine
learning techniques (for example DNNs with ReLUs). At the same time, if the adversary tries to
use models with large n for mounting the attack and deploys it against models with any (small or
large) n, this does not possess a security issue, because the interpretations that any model gives
to these images are consistent with human visual perception.
From this perspective the models with large n can be valuable even if their classification
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accuracy is slightly lower than that of models with small n. They can be used in pair with
another model that has a good classification accuracy, but that is vulnerable to adversarial/rubbish
examples. The first model (with large n) detects a potential adversarial attack. In cases when it is
confident, and its label disagrees with the other more accurate model, one can use the prediction
of the more accurate model for the final classification decision. However if the large n model is
unconfident of a particular input, that input should be labeled as junk and not processed by the
more accurate/vulnerable model.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Although modern machine learning techniques outperform humans on many classification tasks,
there is a serious concern that they do not understand the structure of the training data. A clear
demonstration of this lack of understanding was presented in [1, 2], who showed two examples of
nonsensical predictions of DNNs that contradict to human visual perception: adversarial images
and rubbish images. In the present paper we propose that DAM with higher order interactions
in the energy function produce more sensible interpretations (consistent with human vision) of
adversarial and rubbish images. We argue that these models better mimic human visual perception
than DNNs with ReLUs.
A possible explanation of adversarial examples, pertaining to neural networks being too linear,
was given in [13]. Our explanation follows the same line of thought with some differences. One
result of [11] is that DAMs with large powers of the interaction vertex in the energy function
are dual to feed-forward neural nets with highly non-linear activation functions - the rectified
polynomials of higher degrees. From the perspective of this duality, one might expect that by
simply replacing the ReLUs in DNNs by the higher rectified polynomials one might solve the
problem of adversarial and rubbish images for a sufficiently large power of the activation function.
We tried that and discovered that although DNNs with higher rectified polynomials alone perform
better than DNNs with ReLUs from the adversarial perspective, they are worse than DAMs with
the update rule (1). These observations need further comprehensive investigation. Thus, simply
changing ReLUs to higher rectified polynomials is not enough to get rid of adversarial problems,
and other aspects of the training algorithm presented in section 2 are important.
For thinking about neurobiology the energy functions with higher order interactions considered
in [11] and in this paper should be thought of as effective theories that arise after excluding the
auxiliary variables from the microscopic description. The microscopic realization in terms of
biological neurons will be discussed elsewhere.
There are two straightforward ideas for possible extensions of this work. First, it would be
interesting to complement the proposed training procedure with adversarial training. In other
words to train the network using the algorithm of section 2 but on a combination of clean images
and adversarial images, along the lines of [9, 13]. We expect that this should further increase the
robustness to adversarial examples and increase the classification accuracy on the clean images.
Second, it would be interesting to investigate the proposed methods in the convolutional setting.
Naively, one expects that the adversarial problems are more severe in the fully connected networks
than in the convolutional networks. For this reason we used the fully connected networks for
our experiments. We expect that the training algorithm of section 2 can be combined with
convolutional layers to better describe images.
Although more work is required to fully resolve the problem of adversarial and rubbish images,
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we believe that the present paper has identified a promising computational regime of the neural
networks that significantly mitigates the vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial and rubbish images
and that remains little investigated.
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